Changes between Version 9 and Version 10 of thesis


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Timestamp:
Apr 11, 2011 3:13:16 AM (8 years ago)
Author:
zzz
Comment:

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  • thesis

    v9 v10  
    1616  In fact, most fast peers are from a Class "O" (greater than 128 KBytes/sec) group of routers and those are about 20% of the network - so there's perhaps 400 peers that could potentially be in the fast group in today's network of 2000 - 3000 routers.
    1717
    18   So isn't this really about an adversary taking over a large proportion of the entire network, or at least of the network's fast routers? Is I2P any more vulnerable at X % hostile peers compared to other networks?
     18  So isn't this really about an adversary taking over a large proportion of the entire network, or at least of the network's fast routers? Is I2P any more vulnerable at X % hostile peers compared to other networks? Once you have a large number of hostile fast peers in the network, is the traffic analysis of your attack any quicker or more reliable than other attacks, e.g. first and last node in a tunnel (ref: "one ping enough" paper or blog post about Tor)
    1919
    2020  Unidirectional tunnels as a "bad design decision":