Changes between Version 16 and Version 17 of thesis


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Timestamp:
Apr 11, 2011 2:26:12 PM (9 years ago)
Author:
zzz
Comment:

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  • thesis

    v16 v17  
    2929  So isn't this really about an adversary taking over a large proportion of the entire network, or at least of the network's fast routers? Is I2P any more vulnerable at X % hostile peers compared to other networks? Once you have a large number of hostile fast peers in the network, is the traffic analysis of your attack any quicker or more reliable than other attacks, e.g. first and last node in a tunnel (ref: "one ping enough" paper or blog post about Tor)
    3030
     31  Also not discussed - effect of leaseset size (number of leases or inbound tunnels) which is user-configurable from 1 to 7. It also is configurably dynamic, with less leases when the server is idle. A high number of leases makes it quicker for an adversary to enumerate the fast peers.
     32
    3133  Unidirectional tunnels as a "bad design decision":
    3234
     
    3436
    3537   1) Limit churn:
     38      Possibilities: Increase 45 sec evaluation cycle, increase 30-peer fast max and/or 75-peer high-cap max.
     39
     40      Not a possibility: Increasing 10-minute tunnel lifetime (unfortunately it is essentially hard-coded in the network now)
    3641
    3742   2) Distributed HTTP services:
     
    3944
    4045   3) Use random peers for leases (guard nodes):
    41       By this you mean, I think, using random peers outside the fast tier for the inbound tunnel's gateway, as those are the peers that get published in the leaseset.
     46      By this you mean, I think, using random peers outside the fast tier for the inbound tunnel's gateway. We could also keep these peers semi-constant, or more stable, by attempting to recreate the same tunnel at expiration, while still changing them on rejection. This could be done either from the fast pool or by using a random peer.
     47      Benefits / downsides?
    4248
    4349