Changes between Version 32 and Version 33 of thesis


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Timestamp:
Apr 26, 2011 12:45:45 PM (9 years ago)
Author:
zzz
Comment:

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  • thesis

    v32 v33  
    11Comments on thesis
    2 DEADLINE for initial comments Noon UTC Sunday April 17
     2
    33
    44General comments:
     
    77
    88< FIrst of all thanks a lot for your reply! I'm going to add the comments and hopefully mark them obviously. We will in the next couple of days pass around the current version of the paper to be published.
     9**> Responses by zzz 2011-04-26
    910
    1011Specific comments:
     
    8283
    8384< Yes, this is a bit of a bold statement, but only because we focus on one particular attack / system design aspect, and we might be missing out other issues.  However, we're not aware of any research showing advantages of uni-directional tunnels at this point that would mitigate the issues raised by our analysis. Please let us know if we miss something.[[BR]][[BR]]
     85**> We arent aware on any published research either, but here is some comment by "Complication" and then some links to info on our website, documenting the design decision:
     86      <Complication3> unidirectional tunnels appear to make it harder to detect a request/response pattern, which is quite possible to detect over a bidirectional tunnel (TOR circuit)
     87      <Complication3> since some apps and protocols, very notably HTTP and its brethern, do transfer data in such manner, having the traffic follow the same route to its destination and back, could make it arguably easier for an attacker who has only timing and traffic volume data, to infer the path a tunnel is taking from those
     88      <Complication3> having the response come back along a different path, arguably makes it harder
     89      <Complication3> having proper cover traffic naturally also does
     90**> http://www.i2p2.i2p/tunnel_discussion#tunnel.bidirectional
     91**> http://www.i2p2.i2p/techintro#similar.tor (3rd par.)
    8492
    8593   Once the attacker's routers are a large portion of the victim's fast tier (e.g. 'one ping enough'), all sorts of analysis and attacks are possible, and many would be the same or easier with bidirectional tunnels. While we appreciate the innovation of your timing analysis attack with our unidirectional tunnels, the victim is eventually owned via any number of attacks when his fast tier is overtaken.