Changes between Version 42 and Version 43 of thesis


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Timestamp:
Apr 26, 2011 3:47:31 PM (9 years ago)
Author:
zzz
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  • thesis

    v42 v43  
    6767
    6868< We don't need a constant number of monitors in the victim's fast tier all the time, and obviously this depends on how many attackers, how many monitors, how fast the rest of the network is AND on the configuration of the victim.  Too many factors for a controlled experiment with a clear answer.  What we show is that an adversary controlling X% of your network can use a DoS on the fast tier-estimate to have MORE than X% of his peers in the victim's fast tier.[[BR]][[BR]]
     69
     70**> Right. So we're getting to a much clearer statement of the issues. If an attacker has X% of the network, or X% of the fastest routers, you don't want each to have more of an X% chance of getting into a tunnel, and ideally you want an attack to have less than a X**2 chance of succeeding (two attacking routers in the right place in the tunnels - one ping enough). What we (I2P) wants to do is push the probabilities back to where they should be. As we say on the threat model page, if an attacker owns enough of the network then you are at high risk.
    6971
    7072  In fact, most fast peers are from a Class "O" (greater than 128 KBytes/sec) group of routers and those are about 20% of the network - so there's perhaps 400 peers that could potentially be in the fast group in today's network of 2000 - 3000 routers.